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   ABSTRACT	  
 After the recent housing bubble burst, foreclosures ran rampant across the United 
States. Focused concentrations occurred in Florida, California, Nevada, Utah, and other 
states. Despite government intervention through many foreclosure mitigation plans, the 
housing market is still incredibly volatile today. With many plans proving ineffective, the 
Obama Administration has its hopes set on the Making Home Affordable program 
(MHA), which is broken down into the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) 
and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). This study seeks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification Program on overall and individual 
mortgage servicer levels by assessing changes in effectiveness of the overall program and 
evaluating each mortgage company’s effectiveness over time.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION	  CAUSES	  OF	  FORECLOSURE	  AND	  THE	  FORECLOSURE	  CRISIS	  
In recent years, it has been impossible not to notice the rising number of for-sale 
signs and foreclosures listings springing up in every neighborhood across the United 
States. Some areas have been more affected than others, but every region has noticed 
increasing foreclosure numbers. The reasons surrounding these increases can be debated, 
but historically, a few basic events have caused foreclosures.  
Unemployment is a major cause of foreclosures. With unemployment rates 
soaring in the past half-decade in the United States to heights of 8.9 percent and double 
digits in some areas, a rising number of foreclosures was expected (“What causes house 
foreclosure?,” 2011). In fact, CBS Money Watch credit rising unemployment rates as the 
chief cause of many foreclosures, especially in large metro areas (“Foreclosure rates rise 
on high unemployment,” 2011). Rich Sharga, senior vice president of RealtyTrac, says 
that the first wave of foreclosures was caused by overheated home prices and bad loans, 
but a second wave has been caused by job loss (“Foreclosure rates rise on high 
unemployment,” 2011).  
A decline in property value has also caused foreclosure rates to rise. This cause is 
due mainly to our nation’s current economy as a whole (Deeb, n.d.). Property values have 
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been lost by up to fifty percent (“What causes house foreclosure?,” 2011). Declining 
property values cause an issue referred to as negative equity (when homebuyers owe 
more on the house than it is worth).  This will often called a ruthless default where 
homeowners simply walk away from their mortgage and home despite being able to 
make the payments (Cantrell, 2012). According to data published by Money Watch, 
around 2.4 million homeowners have five percent or less equity in their homes 
(“Foreclosure rates rise on high unemployment,” 2011). In fact, many of the foreclosure 
assistance programs that have been attempted in recent years try to assist with these 
extremely high loan-to-value (LTV) rates.  
Neighborhood quality has declined in recent years as well. Realty101 explains 
that people, unable to sell their homes and choosing not to walk away, have instead 
rented their home to college students or low-income families (“What causes house 
foreclosure?,” 2011). Most of the time, a renter will not maintain the quality of the home 
as well as the actual owner. This issue has caused neighborhoods that were once filled 
with middle-income families to be overtaken by renters that commit violence and damage 
the face of the community (“What causes house foreclosure?,” 2011).  
Trigger events are often the primary producer of foreclosure. Trigger events can 
be anything from divorce to extreme illness. Many couples purchase houses that are only 
affordable with two steady streams of income. Therefore, when a divorce is undergone 
neither party can afford the mortgage payments alone. Divorce rates doubled in the 1970s 
and have remained high since, and foreclosure rates have been on stead uphill slope since 
that time as well (Elmer & Seelig, 2012).  
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Often, it is not merely one of these causes but two or more that cause a mortgage 
default. As the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development explains, 
“foreclosures are most accurately thought of as being driven by a two-stage process- first 
a trigger event reduces the borrower’s financial liquidity, then a lack of home equity 
makes it impossible for the borrower to either sell their home to meet their mortgage 
obligation or refinance into a mortgage that is affordable given their change in financial 
circumstances” (Herbert & Apgar, 2010).  
The mortgage crisis, as compared to the Great Depression, was not something that 
occurred overnight. It was not even predicted overnight. The U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development explains that the first tremor was felt in December of 2006 with 
two subprime lenders by the name of Ownit Mortgage Solutions and Sebring Capital 
shutting their doors (Herbert & Apgar, 2010). Still, forecasters were hopeful suspecting 
that there would only be a slight rise in mortgage delinquency rates. There was a 
deviation in this belief by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), which estimated 
that over one million subprime loans would foreclose. CRL forecasted a foreclosure crisis 
(Herbert & Apgar, 2010). A few short months later in February of 2007, local 
newspapers had declared a mortgage crisis. Between 2006 and 2008, foreclosure starts 
and the ninety-day delinquency rate doubled (Herbert & Apgar, 2010). 
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FORECLOSURE	  PREVENTION	  TOOLS	  AND	  EFFORTS	  
 Most mortgage companies attempt to keep the family in the home while 
mitigating foreclosure. This initially prevents the high costs associated with foreclosure 
from effecting both the borrower and lender. First, for homeowners with short-term 
income loss, it is in the best interest of the mortgage company and the homeowner to 
work out an agreement for the purchaser to continue making regular monthly payments 
with a small, added amount for the missed payments. For homeowners with a slightly 
larger and longer income loss, many mortgage providers will provide forbearance, an 
agreement to not foreclosure for a certain period of time providing that the borrower 
becomes current on his payments in that time frame (Gerardi & Li, 2010). For people 
with permanent money shortages, loan modification is the best option. Loan modification 
has been the primary action suggested by the economic plans proposed to mitigate 
foreclosure (Gerardi & Li, 2010). 
   Although it is usually ideal for both the mortgage company and the homeowner 
for the family to remain in the home, at times, it is simply not a viable option. Out-of-the 
house options include short sales. These sales are pre-foreclosure sales where the 
property is sold at a cost below the mortgage amount, and the remaining amount owed is 
usually set up in a payment plan with the borrower. On rare occasions, the mortgage 
company may even write off the remaining balance of the loan. Another option of this 
type is called a “deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.” Under this option, other property owned by 
the borrower is deeded to the mortgage company to release an amount of the liability 
from the borrower. Both of these options are more cost effective than a foreclosure for 
both the borrower and the mortgage company (Gerardi & Li, 2010). 
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 In response to the foreclosure crisis as a whole, the United States government has 
passed legislation on several different plans to combat foreclosure beginning with the 
FHASecure program in 2007. This was a temporary plan that was later discontinued by 
the Department of Housing and Development. It allowed people with adjustable-rate 
mortgages who were delinquent to refinance. Although it was projected to help 80,000 
people, the actual number of refinances was only 4,212 (Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
 In 2007, HopeNow was also established. HopeNow assisted delinquent 
homeowners in setting up a payment plan or performing permanent loan modification. 
This plan proved to be ineffective as well. Most of the assistance came in the form of 
payment plans rather than loan modification (Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
 In early 2008, Hope for Homeowners (H4H) was passed. This allowed borrowers, 
with the appropriate debt-to-income ratios, to finance to a new 30-40 year fixed-rate 
mortgage. The program involved lenders writing down the principal of the loan; 
therefore, it was not well received. Another problem with this plan was its complex 
nature. Most of the interest rates offered were high as well. H4H was only for a 
borrower’s primary residence (Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
HOME	  AFFORDABLE	  MODIFICATION	  PROGRAM	  
 Many other programs were passed through Congress, and all of them had minimal 
effect.  In response to the perceived failure of the other plans, the Obama administration 
purposed the Making Home Affordable Modification program (MHA) in March of 2009. 
This plan was aimed to increase loan modification through the Home Affordable 
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Modification Program (HAMP) and to increase refinancing through the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program (HARP).  
The Home Affordable Modification Program requires that the same lending 
institutions that received bailout money now implement modifications to qualifying 
loans.  Participation is voluntary for the institutions that did not receive funding 
assistance. HAMP requires that lenders reduce mortgage payments to less than or equal 
to a thirty-eight percent DTI ratio. This plan involves a trial modification where the 
borrower makes the reduced payments. Usually, this process involves a six-month time 
span. Then, if the borrower has proven successful at managing the payments, the 
modification will become permanent (Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
The reported numbers under HAMP have been 900,000 trial modifications started 
and over one million trial modifications offers extended as of December 2009. However, 
it is also reported that the number of permanent modifications has been low (Gerardi & 
Li, 2010). This raises the question of how effective and beneficial this program is if it 
only allows a trial modification of six months (Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
CONTRIBUTION	  TO	  THE	  LITERATURE	  
The majority of the literature considers the Home Affordable Modification 
Program to be a last ditch effort with little promise. Many sources report a good deal of 
trial modification numbers, yet the permanent modification numbers lag far behind. This 
study seeks to evaluate this Home Affordable Modification Program. Since the numerous 
other foreclosure mitigation programs have proven ineffective, this study will test the 
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overall effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) through an 
analysis of the reported Making Home Affordable (MHA) performance reports.  
Since the program is proven effective by trial modifications resulting in 
permanency, this study will evaluate the related trial and permanent modification 
numbers over a span of time. Differences will be evaluated to test for a change in 
effectiveness. This information will yield insight into the programs overall effectiveness 
for the span of time studied and will also yield to projections for the future of the Home 
Affordable Modification Program.  
This program also seeks to evaluate the performance of the Home Affordable 
Modification Program among the top mortgage servicers. The Home Affordable 
Modification Program is composed of voluntary participation among many of the same 
institutions that received bailout money. Analysis has not been completed regarding the 
effectiveness of the program among these institutions. This study seeks to test individual 
mortgage servicer effectiveness through three tests. A test will be performed on the 
proportion of trial modification starts to trial offers extended, the proportion of permanent 
modification starts to trial modification starts, and the proportion of active permanent 
modifications to total permanent modification starts. These proportions will test for 
several areas of effectiveness among the individual mortgage servicers and lend valuable 
information to the customers, the companies, and the government.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION	  
This purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Obama 
Administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program on overall program and 
individual mortgage servicer levels. Data was gathered from the Making Home 
Affordable performance reports for the overall permanent and trial modification starts 
and for the trial modification offers, trial modification starts, permanent modification 
starts, and active permanent modifications of the top mortgage servicers working under 
the program. This chapter discusses the research design, variables, research hypotheses, 
population, research instrument, data collection, and data analysis.  
RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  
To evaluate the performance of the Home Affordable Modification Program 
proposed under the Making Home Affordable program, an overall statistical analysis and 
a micro-level analysis will be performed. To evaluate the overall performance, relevant 
trial modification and permanent modification data will be tested. On the micro-level, 
individual mortgage companies will be tested for three different measurements of 
effectiveness. The measures that are found to be representative of effectiveness for the 
purpose of this study include the trial modification offers and related trial modification 
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starts, trial modification starts and resulting permanent modification starts, and 
cumulative permanent modification starts and related active permanent modifications.  
The data for this research comes from the Making Home Affordable performance 
reports. These reports are provided on a monthly basis by the United States Treasury. 
These reports were first issued in July of 2009. Due to the large amount of monthly data 
provided from July 2009 to present, this study will be providing statistical analysis on a 
quarterly basis. The first quarter studied will be the third quarter of 2009. Due to the 
nature and design of the program, trial modification data is the only data presented in the 
first performance reports. The program has not been in action long enough to result in 
permanent modifications. The last reported performance data to be included in this study 
is the second quarter of 2012. Overall, twelve quarters of data will be included in this 
study.  
The Making Home Affordable performance reports include data related to the 
number of eligible loans for each servicer, the number of trial modifications offered to 
customers, the number of trial modifications started, the number of resulting permanent 
modifications, and the current active number of permanent modifications. The data 
formatting has changed since the reports were first issued. The original list of individual 
mortgage servicers listed in the report included fifteen mortgage lending companies and 
information for “Other SPA Servicers” and “Other GSE Servicers”. Over time, the 
individual mortgage servicers reporting in the performance data has changed and 
decreased in number. The current lists have been reduced to include approximately nine 
consistently reported mortgage servicers.  
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For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to evaluate the mortgage companies 
included during the entire time span of the study (July 2009 to March 2012). The 
individual mortgage servicers included in this study are: American Home Mortgage 
Servicing Inc.; Bank of America, NA; CitiMortgage, Inc.; GMAC Mortgage, LLC; J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, NA; Ocwen Financial Corp, Inc.; OneWest Bank; Select Portfolio 
Servicing; and Wells Fargo Bank, NA. The data related to “Other SPA” and “Other GSE” 
servicers will be excluding because portions are the data are incomplete, and this study is 
mainly concerned with specific mortgage company program performance.  
Testing the before listed proportions and mortgage companies will provide a 
scorecard of the Home Affordable Modification Program’s effectiveness over time and 
provide information related to individual mortgage company effectiveness. This will 
allow for recommendations for actions related to HAMP and future foreclosure 
mitigation programs to be drawn.  
HYPOTHESES	  OVERALL	  PROGRAM	  HYPOTHESIS	  AND	  TESTING	  	  
Overall Home Affordable Modification Program effectiveness hypothesis: 
Ho: All proportions are equal 
(Ho: Π1=Π2=Π3=Π4=Π5=Π6=Π7=Π8=Π9=Π10=Π11=Π12) 
Ha: At least one proportion is different.  
 Π1= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q3 2009 
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 Π2= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q4 2009 
 Π3= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q1 2010 
 Π4= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q2 2010 
 Π5= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q3 2010 
 Π6= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q4 2010 
 Π7= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q1 2011 
 Π8= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q2 2011 
 Π9= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q3 2011 
 Π10= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q4 2011 
 Π11= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q1 2012 
 Π12= the proportion of permanent to trial modifications for Q2 2012	    
 For the test of overall effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification 
Program, a proportion of the permanent to trial modifications will be computed on a 
quarterly basis. These proportions will be tested using the hypothesis above. A Chi-
squared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used in deciding to reject or not reject 
the null hypothesis.  
INDIVIDUAL	  MORTGAGE	  SERVICER	  HYPOTHESES	  AND	  TESTING	  	   	  
 Three different measurements of micro-level effectiveness related to HAMP will 
be tested in this study. The first test involves the trial modification starts that resulted 
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from trial modification offers. The hypotheses being used to evaluate the micro-level 
effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification Program are as follows: 
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Ho: All proportions are equal 
(Ho: Π1 = Π2 = Π3= Π4= Π5= Π6= Π7= Π8= Π9) 
  Ha: At least one proportion is different.  
 Πn will represent proportions of trial modification starts to trial modification 
offers. Πn will represent a proportion related to a specific mortgage lender given in the 
MHA performance reports. The variables are defined as follows: 
Π1 = the proportion related to American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. 
Π2 = the proportion related to Bank of America, NA 
Π3= the proportion related to CitiMortgage, Inc.  
Π4= the proportion related to GMAC Mortgage, LLC 
Π5= the proportion related to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA 
Π6= the proportion related to Ocwen Financial Corp. Inc. 
Π7= the proportion related to OneWest Bank 
Π8= the proportion related to Select Portfolio Servicing 
Π9= the proportion related to Wells Fargo Bank, NA 
The second test of micro-level effectiveness involves a Chi-Squared test of the 
permanent modifications resulting from trial modifications. The hypotheses related to this 
test are as follows: 
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Ho: All proportions are equal 
(Ho: Π1 = Π2 = Π3= Π4= Π5= Π6= Π7= Π8= Π9) 
Ha: At least one proportion is different.  
The same variable definitions apply in this test as in the test before. Each 
numbered proportion represents the proportion related to a specific mortgage lender.  
The third test of micro-level effectiveness involves the proportion of the 
permanent modifications that are active at specific dates. This data will also be evaluated 
on a quarterly basis. The same variable definitions apply. The hypotheses are started as 
follows:  
Ho: All proportions are equal 
(Ho: Π1 = Π2 = Π3= Π4= Π5= Π6= Π7= Π8= Π9) 
Ha: At least one proportion is different.  
POPULATION	  
When the United States’ Treasury began producing the Making Home Affordable 
performance reports including data relevant to the Home Affordable Modification 
Program in July of 2009, the report provided that eighty-five percent of total mortgages 
were covered by the Home Affordable Modification Program. Originally, there were 
thirty-eight mortgage servicers that signed on to work under the HAMP platform. The 
mortgages included in HAMP included loans that were owned or guaranteed by Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac, loans held in portfolio, and loans serviced on behalf of other 
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investors. In the July 2009 report, the thirty-eight mortgages companies held 2,705,302 
mortgages that were 60+ days delinquent and eligible for HAMP participation.  
For the purposes of this study, the data evaluating the overall effectiveness of the 
program gives the number relating to the trial modifications started and cumulative trials 
started on a monthly basis. The individual mortgage servicer data gives mortgage loan 
numbers eligible for the program based on certain criterion and provides the number of 
trial modifications offered and started as well as the permanent modifications starts and 
active permanent modifications.  
DATA	  COLLECTION	  
 The data used in this study is entirely secondary data. The U.S. Department of 
Treasury issues monthly reports related to the Making Home Affordable program. The 
Home Affordable Modification Program is a program listed under Making Home 
Affordable. The monthly MHA performance reports include data related to the Home 
Affordable Modification Program activity. The performance reports are very detailed in 
their coverage of the overall HAMP program as well as data related to individual 
mortgage servicers. For this study, the reports were gathered on a quarterly basis 
beginning with Q3 of 2009 and ending with Q2 of 2012. 
DATA	  ANALYSIS	  
 For testing the hypotheses stated above regarding the overall HAMP 
effectiveness, a Chi-squared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used. This test 
was selected because this study seeks to evaluate whether or not the proportion of trial 
modifications becoming permanent has changed over the life of the program. The 
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proportions computed over time will also be graphed as a visual display of program 
effectiveness. A Spearman’s ranking correlation will also be performed on the proportion 
of trial modifications resulting in permanency to rank effectiveness over the twelve 
quarters studied.  
 For testing the many hypotheses related to the micro-level effectiveness of the 
Home Affordable Modification Program, a Chi-squared Test of the Equality of 
Proportions will also be used. This test was selected because this study seeks to evaluate 
differences among the leading mortgage providers. Should the null hypothesis be rejected 
on any test, the Marascuilo Procedure will be used to assess where the differences in 
proportion lie.  
 On a micro-level analysis level, the Spearman’s Rank Correlation Test will also 
be used. This test will rank each mortgage servicer proportion on a scale. The lower the 
ranking, the more effective that mortgage servicer is in using the Home Affordable 
Modification Program. This will show whether a mortgage servicer is consistently 
performing well or poorly and whether or not the ranking of servicers changes or remains 
relatively consistent.  
CONCLUSIONS	  
 Chapter two describes the research methodology used to evaluate the Home 
Affordable Modification Program proposed by the Obama Administration under Making 
Home Affordable. The research design, hypotheses, variables, population, research 
instrument, data collection methods, and data analysis measures relating to this study 
have been discussed. The following chapter will present study results. 
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CHAPTER	  THREE: 	  RESEARCH	  RESULTS 	  
 The data for this study was gathered from the Making Home Affordable 
Performance reports that are issued on a monthly basis by the United States Treasury. 
Vast amounts of data and information are reported in these issued reports pertaining to 
the overall numbers related to trial and permanent modifications under the Home 
Affordable Modification Program as well as information related to the top mortgage 
servicers and their use of the program.  
 The Home Affordable Modification Program began in May 2009. Reports have 
been issued monthly. Due to the numerous amount of reports, data, and therefore, 
statistical testing required, this study will focus on evaluating the program on a quarterly 
basis. Beginning with Q3 of 2009 and ending with Q2 2012, this study will include an 
analysis of HAMP over a time period spanning twelve quarters. 
OVERALL	  PROGRAM	  EFFECTIVENESS	  
 The tenants of this program state that eligible borrowers should be given a six-
month trial modification of their mortgage, and providing that payments were made on 
time, that trial modification should become a permanent modification of the mortgage 
payments. For the purposes of this study, effectiveness was evaluated on the number of 
trial modifications that resulted in permanency.  
 This study seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the overall program over time. 
The literature related to the Home Affordable Modification Program stated that this was a 
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last ditch effort to mitigate foreclosure. It implied that while the number of trial 
modifications might be promising, mortgage companies were not actually extending the 
trial modifications into permanency and, therefore, making the program effective.  
Figure 1 depicts a graphical representation of the cumulative number of trial and 
permanent modifications on a quarterly basis from Q3 2009 to Q2 2012. Figure 2 depicts 
a graphical representation of related numbers of trial and permanent modification starts 
from Q3 2009 to Q2 2012. 
 Figure 1: Cumulative Trial and Permanent Modifications 
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Figure 2: Trial and Permanent Modifications- Quarterly Starts
 
Summary Results 
Chi-squared Test for Equality of Proportions 
Critical Value: 24.72497031 
X2 Test Statistic: 1611.025141 
P-Value: 0 
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis 
 
To evaluate the overall effectiveness of the program from Q3 2009 to Q2 2012, a 
Chi-squared test was run on the number of cumulative trial modifications that resulted in 
permanency. For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of 
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proportions was used. Using a 0.01 level of significance, a p-value of 0, critical value of 
24.72497031, and test statistic of 1611.025141 was calculated. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. There appears to be differences in the proportion of trial 
modifications becoming permanent over the quarterly time span of Q3 2009 and Q2 
2012. Significant numbers related to this test can be found in appendix A. 
INDIVIDUAL	  MORTGAGE	  SERVICER	  ANALYSIS	  
To test for the effectiveness of the program as related to the top mortgage 
servicers, three different tests of effectiveness were used. A series of three tests of 
effectiveness was run for each quarterly falling in between Q3 2009 and Q2 2012. This 
resulted in over twenty tests evaluating the effectiveness on a micro-level (mortgage 
servicer).  
The first test that was used on each set of quarterly data included testing the 
proportion of trial modification offers that resulting in trial modification starts. As in the 
test of the overall program, a test was run on the trial modifications that resulted in 
permanency. Finally, to test for effectiveness on a more long-term scale, a test was run on 
the cumulative permanent modifications that are currently active.  
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   TRIAL	  MODIFICATION	  OFFERS	  RESULTING	  IN	  TRIAL	  MODIFICATION	  STARTS	  
Chi-­squared	  Test	  for	  Equality	  of	  Proportions:	  Summary	  Results	  
Quarter	   Critical	  Value	   X2	  Test	  
Statistic	  
P-­Value	   Decision	  
Q3	  2009	   20.09	   43,030.728	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2009	   20.09	   19,368.818	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2010	   20.09	   38,176.178	   0	   Reject	  
Q3	  2010	   20.09	   56,007.74	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2010	   20.09	   21,567.06	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2011	   20.09	   28,203.286	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2011	   20.09	   56,406.975	   0	   Reject	  
Q3	  2011	   20.09	   46,266.97	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2011	   20.09	   64,756.28	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2012	   20.09	   76,755.38	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2012	   18.475	   416,541.145	   0	   Reject	  	   	  For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of proportions was 
used. Using a 0.01 significance value, each test (one for each quarter between Q3 2009 
and Q2 2012) resulted in a p-value that caused the null hypothesis to be rejected. There 
are significant differences among the mortgage servicers related to the proportion of trial 
modifications offered and trial modifications started. Significant numbers related to the 
test on a per quarter basis can be found in the appendix. 
TRIAL	  MODIFICATIONS	  RESULTING	  IN	  PERMANENCY	  
Chi-­squared	  Test	  for	  Equality	  of	  Proportions:	  Summary	  Results	  
Quarter	   Critical	  Value	   X2	  Test	  
Statistic	  
P-­Value	   Decision	  
Q4	  2009	   20.09	   74,219.07	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2010	   20.09	   142,413.98	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2010	   20.09	   69,705.61	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2011	   20.09	   71,997.69	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2011	   20.09	   63,007.54	   0	   Reject	  
Q3	  2011	   20.09	   57,582.14	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2011	   20.09	   38,500.71	   0	   Reject	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Q1	  2012	   20.09	   36,736.88	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2012	  	   18.48	   27,985.75	   0	   Reject	  	  
For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of proportions was 
used. Using a 0.01 significance value, each test (one for each quarter between Q4 2009 
and Q1 2012) resulted in a p-value that caused the null hypothesis to be rejected. There 
are differences among the mortgage servicers related to the proportion of trial 
modifications that become permanent.  
Next, a Marasculio procedure was used to evaluate whether or not the differences 
among the proportions and corresponding mortgage servicers was sufficient for specific 
periods. The Marasculio procedure was performed for each quarter beginning with Q4 
2010 and ending with Q2 2012. Due to the large amount of data, three quarters were 
selected for study. Since the objective of this study is to evaluate the Home Affordable 
Modification Program over time, Q4 2010 (the first report issuing trial and permanent 
modification data), Q3 2011 (selected as a mid-point evaluation date), and Q2 2012 (the 
most recent data included in this study) were selected for further evaluation.  
In Q2 2012, based on a 95% confidence level, significant differences were found 
between each of the eight mortgage servicers included. American Home Mortgage 
Servicing was not reported in Q2 2012 and was, therefore, excluded from testing during 
that period.  
The data selected as the mid-range of the program for this study was Q3 2011. 
The Marasculio procedure related to this quarter found that there were significant 
differences among each mortgage servicer with the exception of Group 2: Bank of 
America, NA and Group 7: OneWest Bank. The proportion of trial modifications 
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resulting in permanency was 0.6550 for Bank of America, NA and 0.6512 for OneWest 
Bank. 
Q4 2010 was the first report that issued both trial and resulting permanent 
modification numbers. The Marasculio procedure for this quarter found significant 
differences among each mortgage servicer and their related proportions based on a 0.05 
significance level. Significant numbers related to the test on a per quarter basis and the 
Marasculio procedure can be found in the appendix. 
CUMULATIVE	  PERMANENT	  MODIFICATIONS	  AND	  CURRENT	  ACTIVE	  PERMANENT	  MODIFICATIONS	   	  
Chi-­squared	  Test	  for	  Equality	  of	  Proportions:	  Summary	  Results	  
Quarter	   Critical	  Value	   X2	  Test	  
Statistic	  
P-­Value	   Decision	  
Q4	  2010	   20.09	   3,095.39	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2011	   20.09	   3,200.07	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2011	   20.09	   3,637.26	   0	   Reject	  
Q3	  2011	   20.09	   3,990.97	   0	   Reject	  
Q4	  2011	   20.09	   4,346.72	   0	   Reject	  
Q1	  2012	   20.09	   5,033.695	   0	   Reject	  
Q2	  2012	  	   18.48	   482,320.25	   0	   Reject	  	  
For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of proportions was 
used. Using a 0.01 significance value, each test (one for each quarter between Q3 2009 
and Q2 2012) resulted in a p-value that caused the null hypothesis to be rejected. There 
are significant differences among the mortgage servicers related to the proportion of 
cumulative permanent modifications and current active permanent modifications. 
Significant data related to the test on a per quarter basis can be found in the appendix 
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 Chapter 	  Four : 	  Conc lus ions 	  and 	  Recommendat ions 	  	  
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the Home Affordable Modification 
Program proposed until the Making Home Affordable Platform by the Obama 
Administration. This research objective was achieved through examining and testing the 
data presented in the monthly-issued Making Home Affordable performance reports 
issued by the United States Treasury. The research tested whether there were significant 
differences in the numbers of trial modifications and resulting permanent modifications 
on a quarterly basis since the programs conception in May 2009 and the ending date 
included in this study of June 2012. 
A micro-level analysis of the program’s effectiveness was performed as well by 
evaluating the program on an individual mortgage servicer basis. This analysis included 
testing for differences in the number of trial modification offers and resulting trial 
modification starts for each mortgage servicer, testing for differences in the number of 
trial modification starts and resulting permanent modification starts for each servicer, and 
lastly, testing for differences among the number of permanent modifications started and 
current active modifications on an individual mortgage servicer level.  
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Overall Conclusions 
Object Being Tested Do Not Reject/ Reject Conclusions 
Overall Program 
Effectiveness between Q3 
2009 and Q2 2012  
Reject Significant differences exist 
between the number of trial 
modifications resulting in 
permanency on a quarterly 
basis between Q3 2009 and 
Q2 2012 
Trial Modification Offers 
Resulting in Trial 
Modification Starts 
Reject Significant differences exist 
among the top mortgage 
servicers and the 
proportions of trial offers 
that result in trial starts for 
each quarter tested between 
Q3 2009 and Q2 2012.  
Trial Modification Starts 
and Resulting Permanent 
Modification Starts 
Reject Significant differences exist 
among the top mortgage 
servicers and the 
proportions of trial starts 
that result in permanent 
modification starts for each 
quarter tested between Q3 
2009 and Q2 2012. 
Permanent Modification 
Starts and Current Active 
Permanent Modifications 
Reject Significant differences exist 
among the top mortgage 
servicers and the 
proportions of permanent 
modification starts and 
current active permanent 
modifications for each 
quarter tested between Q3 
2009 and Q2 2012. 
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   OVERALL	  PROGRAM	  CONCLUSION	  	   For the test of overall program effectiveness based on the proportion of trial 
modifications resulting in permanent modifications, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Therefore, the proportions of trial modifications resulting in permanency contain 
significant differences between Q3 2009 and Q2 2012.  
Quarter Proportion Ranking 
Q3 2009 0.0084 12 
Q4 2009 0.0702 11 
Q1 2010  0.1911 10 
Q2 2010 0.3047 9 
Q3 2010 0.3581 8 
Q4 2010 0.3916 7 
Q1 2011 0.4249 6 
Q2 2011 0.4588 5 
Q3 2011 0.4959 4 
Q4 2011 0.5236 3 
Q1 2012 0.5417 2 
Q2 2012 0.5536 1 
 
The research shows that there is a significant difference in program effectiveness 
(the proportion of trial modifications result in permanency) of HAMP over the time span 
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of Q3 2009 and Q2 2012. Based on a Spearman’s ranking correlation test, the proportion 
of cumulative permanent modifications to cumulative trial modifications has consistently 
increased over time suggesting greater program effectiveness. 
INDIVIDUAL	  MORTGAGE	  SERVICER	  CONCLUSIONS	  TRIAL	  MODIFICATIONS	  OFFERS	  RESULTING	  IN	  TRIAL	  MODIFICATION	  STARTS	  
As one of the test evaluating the Home Affordable Modification Program’s 
effectiveness among individual mortgage servicers, the proportion of trial modification 
offers and resulting trial modification starts was tested. Using a Chi-Squared test of the 
equality of proportions, the null hypothesis was rejected for each quarter that was testing 
in between Q3 2009 and Q2 2012. Therefore, significant differences exist among the 
mortgage servicers and their willingness to begin a trial modification after issuing an 
offer. 
TRIAL	  MODIFICATION	  STARTS	  AND	  RESULTING	  PERMANENT	  MODIFICATION	  STARTS	  	  
As in the test for the overall program, since HAMP effectiveness is based on the 
number of trial modifications that result in permanency, a test of the proportion of 
permanent to trial modification starts was testing on the individual mortgage servicer 
level. A Chi-squared test of the equality of proportions was used and each quarter was 
tested between Q3 2009 and Q2 2012. Each quarterly test resulted in p-values and test 
statistics that allowed the null to be rejected. Therefore, it can be concluded that, 
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differences exist among the individual mortgage servicers and the proportions of 
permanent to trial modifications.  
Since a trial modification resulting in permanency is the main source of 
effectiveness for HAMP, further analysis was completed on these proportions. A 
Marasculio procedure was completed for each quarter beginning with Q4 2010 (the first 
quarterly report that issued both trial and permanent modifications) and ending with Q2 
2012 (the final quarter included in this study).  
To evaluate the program over time, Q4 2010, Q3 2011, and Q2 2012 were 
selected as a beginning, middle, and end point of program evaluation. For these quarters, 
significant differences were found between each mortgage servicer’s related data with the 
exception of Bank of America, NA and OneWest Bank in Q3 2011. All relevant Chi-
squared and Marasculio Procedure data is located in the appendix. 
To better evaluate where the differences exist among the mortgage servicer’s 
performance, a Spearman’s Ranking Correlation was used to rank each mortgage servicer 
across the three quarters with extensive testing. This table gives the appropriate ranking 
for each mortgage servicer on a scale of 1 to 9 (best-worst) based on the proportion of 
trial modifications resulting in permanency. The table shows the relevant performance for 
each mortgage servicer over time. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. data was not 
reported in the Q2 2012 performance report; therefore, it was not included in the final 
ranking. 
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 Ranking of Effectiveness Among Mortgage Servicers Over Time 
 Q4 2010  Q3 2011  Q2 2012 
1 Ocwen Loan Servicing 1 American Home Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc. 
1 GMAC Mortgage, LLC 
2 GMAC Mortgage, LLC 2 Ocwen Loan Servicing, Inc. 2 OneWest Bank 
3 American Home Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc. 
3 GMAC Mortgage, LLC 3 Ocwen Loan Servicing 
4 OneWest Bank 4 OneWest Bank 4 Select Portfolio Servicing 
5 Select Portfolio Servicing 5 Select Portfolio Serving 5 JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
NA 
6 CitiMortgage, Inc 6 Wells Fargo Bank, NA 6 Well Fargo Bank, NA 
7 Wells Fargo Bank, NA 7 JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 7 Bank of America, NA 
8 JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
NA 
8 CitiMortgage, Inc. 8 CitiMortgage, Inc. 
9 Bank of America, NA 9 Bank of America, NA 9 N/A 
 
 Ocwen Loan Serving has worked very effectively with HAMP throughout the 
programs existence. In the Q4 2010 report, 72.03% of trial modification resulted in 
permanency.  On the Q3 2011 report, the proportion was 77.55%. As the final report 
included in this study, the Q2 2012 report showed a proportion of 61.15%. It appears that 
Ocwen operated more effectively under HAMP at the beginning and middle of the 
program.  
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 GMAC Mortgage, LLC remained a top participant during the program as 
compared to the other mortgage servicers. GMAC’s proportions included: Q4 2012- 
68.68%, Q3 2011- 73.81% and Q2 2012- 74.86%. GMAC Mortgage has shown continual 
grown in performance related to HAMP. 
 American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. is difficult to evaluate due to the lack 
of data for the final reporting period. The relevant proportion for Q4 2010 and Q3 2011 
were 65.24% and 78.65% respectively.  
 OneWest Bank placed fourth, fourth, and second respectively across the quarters 
included in this study. Relevant proportions were 48.98%, 56.02%, and 62.89%. 
 Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. operated at 48.71% for Q4 2010, 55.06% for Q3 
2011, and 56.60% for Q2 2012. It remained as a steady mid-level performer among the 
servicers. 
 CitiMortgage, Inc. has relevant proportions of 36.09%, 42.91%, and 45.98% 
respectively. Although the proportions have improved, the other mortgage servicers have 
improved more rapidly, and CitiMortgage continually dropped in the ranking.  
 Wells Fargo Bank, NA reported proportions of 35.83%, 47.49%, and 51.90%. 
Although relative placement of this servicer has remained fairly steady, the relevant 
proportion has increased over time. 
 JP Morgan Chase, NA was one of the most poorly functioning servicers as related 
to HAMP effectiveness at the beginning of the program. The relevant proportions were 
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34.68%, 44.94%, and 53.87%. Over time, JP Morgan showed improvement in its 
proportion and ranking.  
 Bank of America was consistently the worse or one of the worst mortgage 
servicers in relation to HAMP effectiveness. The relevant proportions were 28.79%, 
42.23%, 47.54%. Bank of America has endured many financial hardships in recent years 
which might explain the poor performance in HAMP. The proportion of trial 
modifications resulting in permanency never crossed 50%. 
 
PERMANENT	  MODIFICATION	  STARTS	  AND	  RESULTING	  CURRENT	  ACTIVE	  PERMANENT	  MODIFICATIONS	  
 The final test of effectiveness on a micro-level involved testing the proportion of 
permanent modification starts that are currently active. Effective HAMP results will not 
be achieved if permanent modifications are cancelled shortly after they begin. For the 
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purposes of this study, it is assumed that effectiveness is achieved through active 
permanent modifications. There is, however, a chance that a portion of the inactive 
permanent modifications resulted from mortgage payoff or another favorable result.  
 A Chi-squared test of the equality of proportions was used to test each set of 
quarterly data related to permanent modifications starts and current active permanent 
modifications between Q3 2009 and Q2 2012. For each test, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. Therefore, it can be concluded that, differences exist among the proportions of 
cumulative and active permanent modifications and the related mortgage servicers.  
RECOMMENDATIONS	  
 From this analysis, one key recommendation can be drawn related to HAMP 
activity among the mortgage servicers included in this study. The tenants of this program 
suggest that financial rewards would be provided to the mortgage servicers should they 
effectively implement and use the Home Affordable Modification Program. This program 
is aimed at the institutions that received bailout money while it is completely voluntary.  
RECOMMENDATIONS	  TO	  THREE	  GROUPS	  
 Initially, the Treasury Department estimated that HAMP “could reach” between 
3-4 million homeowners (Jones, 2011). The June 2012 MHA performance report 
announced that over 1.2 million “homeowner assistance actions” had been taken through 
HAMP. Roughly, HAMP has only performed half as well as was originally estimated.  
 When HAMP was first announced, it was estimated that $75 billion would be 
spent on the program (Jones, 2011). Fifty billion would come from Troubled Asset Relief 
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Program (TARP) funds, and $25 billion would come from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
and the loans they service (Jones, 2011). TARP funds are used to pay the servicers, 
borrowers, and investors incentive payments. 
 Currently the financial incentives under HAMP provide mortgage companies with 
an incentive payment when a modification becomes permanent. Mortgage servicers can 
also receive “pay-for-success” payments of $1,000 per year for up to three years if the 
borrower remains current on the modified payments (Jones, 2011). 
 As explained before, effectiveness among the individual mortgage servicers 
differs among the mortgage companies and across the time span of the program. As an 
example, Ocwen Loan Servicing exercises HAMP quite effectively while Bank of 
America has always ranked last in program effectiveness. It seems that Congress has 
consistently rewarded the mortgage servicers through bailout money and financial 
incentives through HAMP, yet not all mortgage servicers have been using that money 
effectively and working with their consumers.  
CONGRESS	  
 This raises the question of whether punishment would work more effectively than 
rewarding the mortgage servicers. Perhaps Congress should establish a minimum 
percentage of mortgages that must be given the opportunity of a trial and resulting 
permanent start, and should the mortgage company fail to offer those chances, they will 
be penalized by a specified monetary amount.   
 This punishment could apply to each area of effectiveness covered in this study. 
There should be minimum requirements for the proportion of trial offers that result in 
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starts, trial starts that result in permanent starts, and current permanent active 
modifications out of the cumulative permanent starts.  
 For the mortgage servicers like Ocwen Loan Servicing who have fully utilized 
HAMP, there should be the financial incentives; however the concept of fiscal 
punishment needs to be included into foreclosure mitigation program in the future to spur 
activity among the mortgage servicers.  
MORTGAGE	  BORROWERS	  
 This study can also provide insight to future mortgage borrowers as to companies 
they should choose to finance through. Mortgage borrows should consider the results of 
this study when borrowing from a lender that implements foreclosure mitigation 
programs effectively. This will protect them better in the event of a foreclosure. 
FINANCIAL	  INSTITUTIONS	  
 Finally, financial institutions should use this study to evaluate their performance 
relative to their competitors and strive toward greater effectiveness related to their 
foreclosure mitigation efforts. Foreclosure costs both the lender and borrower; therefore, 
it does not make sense why mortgage lenders would not be focusing their efforts on these 
mitigation programs.  
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   RECOMMENDATIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  	  
	   The study of Home Affordable Modification Program effectiveness could be more 
effective if it included more mortgage companies. To adequately evaluate the entire 
program, data needs to be studied for all thirty-eight original mortgage servicers that 
signed on to HAMP in 2009. 
 Another area that needs research involves the inactive permanent modification. 
For the permanent modification that ended early, the causes of termination need to be 
identified. This would allow a researcher the opportunity to assess whether the inactivity 
resulted from a positive aspect (i.e. mortgage payoff) or from a negative aspect (i.e. 
foreclosure). A similar study should be conducted for the trial modifications that never 
achieved permanency.  
 While this study evaluates the program’s effectiveness over time and among 
mortgage servicers, further research should be conducted by comparing this program to 
other foreclosure mitigation programs implemented in the past or upcoming foreclosure 
mitigation program proposed by Congress. 
	   40	  
 
Bib l iography 	  
Avoiding foreclosure. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Retrieved 
on February 26, 2012, from 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure 
Bernanke, B. (2007, September 7). Subprime mortgage lending and mitigating 
foreclosures. Speech presented before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. 
House of Representatives. Retrieved on February 26, 2012, from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20070920a.htm 
Brenoff, A. (2011, August 25). The mortgage fix that can save the economy. AOL Real 
Estate. Retrieved on February 14, 2012, from 
http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2011/08/25/the-mortgage-fix-that-can-save-the-
economy/ 
Bunce, H. L., Gruenstein, D., Herbert, C. E., & Scheessele, R. M. Subprime foreclosures: 
The smoking gun of predatory lending? Housing Policy in the New Millennium, 
257-272. Retrieved January 31, 2012, from 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/brd/12Bunce.pdf 
Cano, C. Austin, W. & Fontenot, R. Optional risk sharing: Avoiding ruthless behavior in 
the residential real estate market. Research in Business and Economics 
Journal.Retrieved on February 25, 2012, from 
http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/11793.pdf 
Cantrell, K. (2012, February 24). Interview by S. Perkins [Personal Interview]. Causes of 
foreclosures. , Gray, Tennessee. 
Cordell, L., Dynan, K., Lehnert, A., Liang, N., & Mauskopf, E. (2009) Designing loan 
modifications to address the mortgage crisis and the making home affordable 
program. Finance and Economics Discussion Series Division of Research & 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.. 
Retrieved on February 14, 2012, from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2009/200943/200943pap.pdf 
Deeb, C. Declining real estate values. eHow. Retrieved on November 19, 2012, from 
http://www.ehow.com/info_8149101_declining-real-estate-values.html 
DePaul, J. & Pianin, E. (2011, October 24). New obama mortgage plan: A dose of 
stimulus?. The Fiscal Times. Retreived on February 14, 2012, from 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/10/24/New-Obama-Mortgage-Plan-
A-Dose-of-Stimulus.aspx#page1 
	   41	  
Edmiston, K. D., & Zalneraitis, R. (2007). Rising foreclosures in the United States: A 
perfect storm. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 115-145. 
Retrieved January 31, 2012, from 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/4Q07Edmiston.pdf 
Elmer, P. & Seelig, S. The rising long-term trend of single-family mortgage foreclosure 
rates. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Division of Research and Statistics. 
Retrieved on February 6, 2012, from 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/98-2.pdf 
Foreclosure rates rise on high unemployment. (2011, January 27). CBS Money Watch. 
Retrieved February 6, 2012, from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/27/business/main7289451.shtml 
Gandel, S. (2011, May 23). Is the home foreclosure crisis ending?. The New York Times. 
Retrieved on February 27, 2012, from http://business.time.com/2011/05/23/is-the-
home-foreclosure-crisis-ending/ 
Gerardi, K. & Li, W. (2010, June 30). Mortgage foreclosure prevention efforts. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review. Retrieved on February 26, 2012, from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=foreclosure+prevention&hl=en&btnG=Searc
h&as_sdt=1%2C43&as_sdtp=on 
Glink, I. (2009, December 10). 4 reasons why foreclosures might increase in 2010. CBS 
Money Watch. Retrieved on February 12, 2012, from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-37141368/4-reasons-why-
foreclosures-might-increase-in-2010/ 
Hatcher, D. (2006) Foreclosure alternatives: A case for preserving homeownership. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Retrieved on February 26, 2012, from 
https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/profitwise_news_and_vie
ws/2006/02_2006_foreclosure_alt.pdf 
Herbert, C. & Apgar, W. (2010, January). Report to congress on the root causes of the 
foreclosure crisis. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Retrieved on February 25, 2012 from 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/Foreclosure_09.pdf 
House of Representatives, (2010). Foreclosed justice: Causes and effects of the 
foreclosures crisis. Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing website: 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-158_62935.PDF 
Immergluck, D. (2008, February 8). From the subprime to the exotic: excessive mortgage 
market risk and foreclosures. Journal of the American Planning Association, 
74(1), 2-18. Retrieved January 31, 2012, from 
http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~di17/JAPA_08.pdf 
Jones, K. “Testimony of Katie Jones Analyst in Housing Policy Congressional Research 
Service.” Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity 
	   42	  
of the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on “Legislative Proposals to 
End Taxpayer Funding for Ineffective Foreclosure Mitigation Programs”. 2 Mar 
2011.  
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/030211jones.pdf 
 
Klein, G. & Kavanagh, S. Causes of the subprime foreclosure crisis and the availability 
of class action responses. Northeastern University Law Journal. Vol. 2, No. 1. 
137-191. Retreived on February 27, 2012, from 
http://www.nulj.org/journal/Klein-Kavanagh.pdf 
Liebowitz, S. (2009, July 3). New evidence on the foreclosure crisis: Zero money down, 
not subprime loans, let to the mortgage meltdown. The Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved on February 12, 2012, from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124657539489189043.html 
Martin, J. Understanding the causes and consequences of residential mortgage 
foreclosure problems. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Retrieved on February 
27, 2012, from 
http://www.richmondfed.org/banking/supervision_and_regulation/newsletter/201
1/pdf/srperspectives_2011-winter-insert.pdf 
Pinedo, A. & Baumgardner A. (2009). Federal mortgage modification and foreclosure 
prevention efforts. Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal. Vol. 41 (4). 319-345. 
Retrieved on February 14, 2012, from 
http://www.mofo.com/docs/pdf/FederalMortgage_UCCLJVol41No4_09.pdf 
Shenn, J. (2011, December 11). BofA: Obama refinancing-plan details trouble. 
Bloomberg. Retrieved on February 14, 2012, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-08/bank-of-america-says-obama-s-
refinancing-plan-details-trouble-home-lenders.html 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (2009). Interim report to congress 
on the root causes of the foreclosure crisis. Retrieved from website: 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/int_foreclosure_rpt_congress.pdf 
(2011, July 13). What causes house foreclosures? Home Foreclosures. Retrieved on 
February 27, 2012, from http://www.realty101.com/what-causes-house-
foreclosures 
	   43	  
 APPENDIX 	  
Appendix A: Chi2 Test Results 
	   44	  
Appendix B: Chi2 Test Results 
 
 
	   45	  
Appendix C: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   46	  
Appendix D: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   47	  
Appendix E: Chi2 Test Results 
 
 
 
 
	   48	  
Appendix F: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   49	  
Appendix G: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   50	  
Appendix H: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   51	  
Appendix I: Chi2 Test Results 
 
 
	   52	  
Appendix J: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   53	  
Appendix K: Chi2 Test Results 
 
 
	   54	  
Appendix L: Chi2 Test Results 
 
 
	   55	  
Appendix M: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   56	  
Appendix N: Chi2 Test Results 
 
	   57	  
Appendix O: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   58	  
 
Appendix P: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   59	  
 
Appendix Q: Chi2 Test Results
	   60	  
Appendix R: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   61	  
Appendix S: Chi2 Test Results
 
 
	   62	  
Appendix T: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   63	  
Appendix U: Chi2 Test Results
	   64	  
Appendix V: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   65	  
Appendix W: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   66	  
Appendix X: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   67	  
Appendix Y: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   68	  
Appendix Z: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   69	  
Appendix AA: Chi2 Test Results
	   70	  
 Appendix AB: Chi2 Test Results
 
	   71	  
Appendix AC: Chi2 Test Results
	   72	  
Appendix AD: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
 
 
	   73	  
 
Appendix AE: Marasculio Procedure Table 
 
	   74	  
 
Appendix AF: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
 
	   75	  
Appendix AG: Marasculio Procedure Table
 
	   76	  
Appendix AH: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
	   77	  
 
Appendix AI: Marasculio Procedure Table 
 
	   78	  
Appendix AJ: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
	   79	  
Appendix AK: Marasculio Procedure Table
 
	   80	  
Appendix AL: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
	   81	  
 
Appendix AM: Marasculio Procedure Table 
 
	   82	  
	  
Appendix AN: Marasculio Procedure 
 
	   83	  
 
Appendix AO: Marasculio Procedure 
 
	   84	  
Appendix AP: Marasculio Procedure 
 
 
	   85	  
 
Appendix AQ: Marasculio Procedure Table 
 
